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I NTRODUCTION : THE R ISKY BUSINESS OF MORTGAGEBACKED SECURITIES2

The securitization3 of residential mortgages4 was supposed to
be a way to make more money available to lenders to lend to
creditworthy5 borrowers for home purchases. 6 It was supposed to
be the vehicle through which investors would help “finance the

2. Mortgage-backed securities comprise the secondary mortgage market.
See Roy T. Black & Joseph S. Rabianski, Georgia Real Estate InfoBase pt. 10
ch. 45 para. 1-2 (Adrienne Black & Judith Weisman eds., 2009),
www.grec.state.ga.us/infobase/table%20of%20contents%20pdf/Chapter%2045.
pdf. The primary mortgage market consists of the lending transactions that
occur between lenders and borrowers. Id. These transactions are the
underlying transactions in mortgage-backed securities. Id.
3. Mortgage securitization is “the act of pooling mortgages and issuing a
security backed by these mortgages.” Trust for Investment in Mortgages
Proposal and Tax Treatment of Secondary Mortgage Market: Hearing on
S.1822 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong. 169 (1983) [hereinafter
“Mortgages Proposal Hearing”] (statement of Lewis S. Ranieri, Managing
Director, Salomon Brothers, Inc.). Once mortgages are securitized, they are
tradable on the secondary market. See Tim Plaehn, What is Mortgage
Securitization?,
DEMAND
MEDIA
(last
visited
Apr.
25,
2016),
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/mortgage-securitization-2645.html. The proceeds
of the monthly payments on the underlying mortgages are then distributed to
the investors. See Quick Guide to Pooling and Servicing Agreements in
Foreclosure Cases [hereinafter “Quick Guide”], The Legal Aid Society of
Cleveland
(last
visited
Apr.
25,
2016),
http://lasclev.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/11/Quick-Guide-to-Pooling-and-Servicing-Agreementsin-Foreclosure-Cases.pdf (citing the case of Wells Fargo v. Jordan No. 91675,
2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 881 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) where the investors who
purchased the securities received payments on the underlying securitized
mortgages).
4. A mortgage is a document that encumbers the real estate and provides
the lender’s security for loan repayment. See STEVEN H. G IFIS , LAW
DICTIONARY 347 (Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 6th ed. 2010). The terms of
the loan are evidenced by a promissory note. See American Securitization
Forum, Transfer and Assignment of Residential Mortgage Loans in the
Secondary
MORTGAGE
MARKET
7
(Nov.
16,
2010)
www.
americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_White_Paper_11_16_10.pdf .
5. A creditworthy borrower is someone to whom it is justified to extend
credit.
MERRIAM -WEBSTER,
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/credit
worthy (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) (determining whether someone is
creditworthy is made based on past ability to repay debts. However, loan
originators in the mid-to-late 2000’s made that determination based off of
factors not related to the borrower’s ability to repay. A discussion of those
factors is beyond the scope of this comment).
6. See generally Mortgages Proposal Hearing, supra note 3, at 168-176,
(arguing that the entry of private investors into the fie ld of mortgage-backed
securities would allow lenders to tap into more funding to be able to lend to
borrowers; Ranieri’s statement to the Senate makes no mention of the effect
that inviting private investors to participate in mortgage -backed securities
would have on lending guidelines, but hindsight is 20/20).
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[American] dream of homeownership for generations to come.”7
However, the packaging of residential mortgages into mortgagebacked securities (hereinafter “MBS”) for trading on the secondary
mortgage market was one of the contributing factors to the recent
downturn in the economy. 8 From 1990 to 2007, the volume of MBS
traded on the secondary market exploded from $380 billion to a
$2.2 trillion bubble. 9 During that same time period, mortgage
originations10 jumped from $459 billion to $2.3 trillion. 11 This
activity, among other factors, contributed to a bubble in which
lenders made mortgage debt easily accessible to individuals who
were eager to consume the debt. 12 Once the bubble burst, it left a
great recession and a high rate of foreclosures in its wake. 13

7. Id. at 170. See also Black & Rabianski, supra note 2, at pt. 10 ch. 45
para. 2 (stating that “In the very simplest terms, the secondary mortgage
market is a provider or source of funds to the primary mortgage market.”).
8. Compare Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 441 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2010) (stating that because securitizations became increasingly
complex and widespread, they contributed to the “crisis in the financial
markets”), with Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy Intersections: The Right to
Foreclose and the U.C.C., 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV 1205, 1209 (2013) (setting
forth that rather than securitization itself, human investors encouraged
increased loan originations and mishandled documents that were supposed to
be transferred specifically according to the terms of the securitization deal),
and Shawn Tully, Lewie Ranieri Wants to Fix the Mortgage Mess, FORTUNE
(Dec. 9, 2009 8:24 AM) http://archive.fortune.com/2009/12/08/real_est
ate/lewie_ranieri_mortgages.fortune/index.htm (blaming Wall Street for using
securitization to create the eventually “onerous” mortgage products that
contributed to the crisis). Because of the importance of the secondary
mortgage market to the primary mortgage market, it is important to
distinguish the transaction of securitization from the underlying practices that
occurred in securitizing residential mortgage loans.
9. U.S. Census Bureau, The Statistical Abstract of the United States, § 25
at745tbl.1199(2012), www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/banking.pdf.
10. A mortgage origination is “[t]he creation of a new mortgage.” INVESTOR
WORDS , www.investorwords.com/7169/mortgage_origination.html (last visited
Apr. 25, 2016).
11. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 9, at 743 tbl.1194.
12. See Scott P. Kennedy, The Good Faith Approach to Foreclosure
Mediation: An Assessment of Washington’s Foreclosure Mediation Program 56
(Aug.2012)
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&
context=scott_kennedy (explaining how subprime mortgages contributed to
the housing bubble); see generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness,
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 395 (Apr. 2009) (asserting that consumers’ hearty consumption of debt
combined with the deregulation of the consumer credit market contributed to
the housing bubble).
13. See R.A., Grasping at an Understanding of the Crisis, THE ECONOMIST
(Jan. 8, 2011 8:10 PM), www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/01/
greatrecession (“The government’s efforts to [expand credit] helped produce
the housing bubble, which led directly to crisis and recession.”).
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By the end of 2007, the foreclosure rate reached its highest at
2.04% of all loans outstanding nationwide. 14 By the end of 2009,
the foreclosure rate more than doubled to 4.58%. 15 Securitizing
residential mortgages provided the capital which facilitated
homeownership, but Wall Street’s rush to capitalize on investment
opportunities, 16 the natural ebb and flow of home values, and the
commission incentives provided to loan originators 17 inflated the
housing bubble to its capacity and led to the inevitable decline of
the market.
In the aftermath of the housing bubble bust, Congress created
an administrative agency named the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). 18 The CFPB is charged with
regulating the residential lending industry. 19 In furtherance of its
regulatory responsibility, 20 the CFPB implemented the Ability-toRepay rule (hereinafter “ATR”). 21 The ATR provides either a safe
harbor22 or rebuttable presumption of compliance23 for certain
14. Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National
Delinquency Survey, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n para. 2, 4 (Mar. 6, 2008),
www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/60619.htm; The Joint
Economic Committee, Subprime Mortgage Market Crisis Timeline, 6 (July
2008),
www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/4cdd7384-dbf6-40e6-adbc-789f6
9131903/subprimetimelineupdate0710080000000.pdf.
15. Delinquencies, Foreclosure Starts Fall in Latest MBA National
Delinquency Survey, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS ’N para. 1 (Feb. 19, 2010),
www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter.71891.h tm.
16. MICHAEL W. HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A G ANG OF PREDATORY
LENDERS AND WALL STREET BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA – AND SPAWNED A
G LOBAL CRISIS 218 (2010) (“With so much money to be made . . . on Wall
Street [off of] securities deals, it made sense for . . . investment banks to . . .
buy directly into the mortgage-origination business.”) It is important to note
that while securitization funds purchases of homes, it also creates an income
stream for investors. This income stream provides the incentive for the
investor to invest!
17. See, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE
HERE : THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 213 (2010) (recanting
the story of a mortgage broker in which the broker worked with “an originator
that made $31,000 on one loan”).
18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
[hereinafter “Dodd-Frank”], 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641, 5491 (2016).
19. Dodd-Frank § 5511(b) (all of the CFPB’s authorities are to be exercised
“with respect to consumer financial products and services”; residential
mortgage lending is one of those types of services).
20. See generally Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Overview , 68 BUS . LAW 557
(Feb. 2013) (providing further insight into the CFPB’s regulatory
responsibility).
21. CFPB Ability to Repay Rule [hereinafter “ATR”], 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43
(2016).
22. The safe harbor “provides the lender with a conclusive presumption
that it has complied with the [ATR]”, thereby disallowing the borrower from
showing otherwise. Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against
Bubbles: How Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street
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residential mortgage products. 24 Residential mortgage products25
that contain payment-shock features26 (hereinafter “nontraditional mortgage products”)27 are not afforded a safe harbor or
presumption of compliance. 28 This Comment proposes that nontraditional mortgage products should not be excluded from the
protection of a rebuttable presumption29 of compliance. If nontraditional mortgage products are excluded, the exclusion will
deter the controlled rebirth of the secondary mortgage market and,
contrary to the CFPB’s initial objective, 30 restrict consumers’
access to non-traditional mortgage products. 31

Safe-From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV . 1539, fn. 209 (May 2015) (emphasis
added).
23. The rebuttable presumption allows for the borrower to make a showing
that “at the time the loan was originated, the borrower lacked sufficient
income to make required debt payments and to make living expenses.” Id.
citing ATR § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii)(B).
24. ATR § 1026.43(e)(1)(i)(ii).
25. The phrase “residential mortgage product” refers to the terms under
which the borrower can obtain a loan. For example, loan products vary based
on the type of financing as dictated by the promissory note (such as a fixed or
adjustable interest rate) or the amount required for a down payment. See, e.g.,
MB Financial Bank, www.mbfinancial.com/personal/borrowing/mortgage/
mortgage-loan-products/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) (listing the
types of mortgage products and their respective terms).
26. See Lew Sichelman, Mortgage Lenders try to Avoid ARM ‘Payment
Shock’ for Buyers, CHI . TRIB., (Aug. 20, 1988), http://articles.chicagotribune
.com/1988-08-20/news/8801240742_1_maximum-second-year-rate-paymentshock-mortgages (explaining how a payment shock feature works with an
adjustable-rate loan).
27. Non-traditional products provide for a sudden increase in the monthly
payment over the monthly payments required to be paid in the beginning of
the loan term. Allen J. Fishbein & Patricia Woodall, Exotic or Toxic? An
Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for Consumers and
Lenders, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF A MERICA, 1 (May 2006), www. consumerfed.
org/pdfs/Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0506.pdf.
28. ATR C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(i)(A)-(C)(2016).
29. A rebuttable presumption is:
an ordinary presumption which must, as a matter of law, be
made once certain facts have been proved, and which is thus
said to establish a prima facie conclusion[. The
presumption] may be . . . overcome through the introduction
of contrary evidence, but if it is not, it becomes conclusive. . .
. After rebutting evidence is introduced . . . the competing
facts are weighed on their own merits, without further
reference to the presumption.
G IFIS , supra note 4, at 412.
30. See Mogilnicki & Malpass, supra note 20, at 561 (stating that the
CFPB’s goal was to strike “an appropriate balance between ensuring that
consumers are not sold mortgages they cannot afford and making mortgages
accessible”).
31. The only residential mortgage products that the ATR rule affords a
safe harbor or a rebuttable presumption of compliance are those products that
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Part II of this Comment examines the residential mortgage
lending landscape before and after the decline of the housing
market. Part III analyzes the justifications for excluding nontraditional mortgage products from the protection of a rebuttable
presumption of compliance. Next, Part III evaluates the
differences in ATR requirements between non-traditional
mortgage products and traditional mortgage products (focusing on
the 43% maximum debt-to-income ratio (hereinafter “DTI”)32 and
the “reasonable and good faith determination”). 33 Finally, Part III
evaluates the effect the exclusion will have on the secondary
mortgage market and consumers’ access to non-traditional
mortgage products. Part IV proposes that the framework the ATR
mandates for traditional mortgage products should apply to nontraditional mortgage products because there is no substantial
difference in ATR requirements between the two mortgage
products. Part V concludes that non-traditional mortgage products
should be afforded a rebuttable presumption of compliance.

fit the ATR’s definition of qualified mortgages [hereinafter “QMs”]. ATR §
1026.43(e)(1)(i)-(ii). Non-traditional products are not QMs. ATR §
1026.43(e)(2)(i)(A)-(C). The ATR rule draws its definition of QMs from DoddFrank. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) [hereinafter “ATR Rule and QM
Standards”], 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
1026.43) (stating that Dodd-Frank “established . . . a certain category of
mortgages, called ‘qualified mortgages’” and the ATR rule is an
implementation of that statutory construct). Therefo re, this comment
ultimately proposes that Dodd-Frank should be amended to include nontraditional products in its definition of QMs and that the distinction between
QMs and non-QMs should be obliterated. However, since Dodd-Frank vested
regulatory authority in the CFPB to finalize the rule regarding QMs, Id. at
6408. The ATR rule is the subject of this comment.
32. “A debt-to-income ratio is one way lenders measure . . . ability to
manage the payments [a borrower] make[s] every month to repay the
[borrowed money].” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What is a Debt-toIncome Ratio? Why is the 43% Debt-to-Income Ratio Important?, (Dec. 30,
2013),
www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1791/what-debt-income-ratio-why43-debt-income-ratio-important.html; see also Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v.
Flagstar Bank, FSB 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16682 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(stating that the DTI measures “a borrower’s capacity to repay a loan.”).
33. The ATR rule requires that a lender make a “reasonable and good faith
determination . . . that the [borrower] will have a reasonable ability to repay
the loan.” ATR § 1026.43(c)(1). The ATR rule sets forth that a presumption of
compliance is rebutted by a showing that the lender “did not make a
reasonable and good faith determination of the [borrower’s] repayment
ability.” ATR § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii)(B).
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II. BACKGROUND: E XPANSION AND CONTRACTION ON THE
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE34
In the years before private investor activity saturated the
secondary mortgage market, residential mortgage products were
generally offered with a one-size-fits-all approach; there was little
to no customization to fit borrowers’ unique circumstances. 35 Once
private investors entered the secondary mortgage market, 36
lenders began offering non-traditional mortgage products in order
to entice private investors. Also, lenders relaxed underwriting
guidelines, 37 which resulted in more types of borrowers being able
to qualify for residential mortgage loans. 38 Private investors
bought residential mortgage loans from the lenders that
consummated the loans, thereby transferring the risk of the loans
out of lender portfolios and onto the secondary mortgage market.
The transferred risk made lenders comfortable in offering non-

34. Comprised of mortgage-backed securities, the secondary mortgage
market funds the primary mortgage market by attracting funds from investors
who invest in mortgage-backed securities. See BLACK & RABIANSKI , supra note
2, at pt. 10 ch. 45 para. 2. When investors purchase mortgage -backed
securities, the funds from the purchase are directed “to the lenders in the
primary mortgage market.” Id. “As a result, the secondary mortgage market
directly affects the amount and cost of funds in the primary market.” Id.
35. See Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that the majority
of mortgage products offered were either those with fixed interest rates or
adjustable interest rates); See also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Interagency
Guidance on Non-Traditional Mortgage Product Risks, para. 2 (Apr. 20, 2014),
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-5150.html
[hereinafter
“FDIC”]
(“While some institutions have offered nontraditional mortgages for many
years with appropriate risk management and sound portfolio performance, the
market for these products and the number of institutions offering them has
expanded rapidly.”).
36. This was not the first time that private investors have participated in
mortgage-backed securities. MBSs date back to at least the 19th century.
Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND.
L.J. 213, 214 (2013).
37. Mortgage underwriting is the process of evaluating against guidelines
established by a lender the collateral underlying a loan as well as a borrower’s
income, assets, and credit. Mortgage underwriting guidelines control risk by
requiring the collection of documentation to support a borrower’s ability to
repay the loan and setting limitations on various factors relevant to a
borrower’s risk of default. Flagstar Bank, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16682, at
*11-12.
38. See Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How Did it
Happen and How Will it End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 13, 14 (2007) (stating
that “the continued demand for subprime [mortgage -backed securities] may
have contributed to loosened underwriting standards, which in turn resulted
in the approval of borrowers who otherwise may not have qualified for
mortgage loans”).
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traditional mortgage products because lenders did not have to
keep the associated risk in their portfolios. 39
The activity on the secondary mortgage market was partially
to blame for the disaster of the housing market in 2007. 40 In
response to the disaster, Congress created the CFPB. 41 The CFPB
implemented the ATR pursuant to its rulemaking authority, and
in an effort to prevent the types of lending practices that occurred
during the housing boom. 42 The following sections of Part II of this
comment give a brief overview of the residential mortgage lending
landscape before and during the expansion of the housing bubble.
Part II ends with an overview of the current lending landscape
and Congress’ response to the housing crisis.

A. Residential Mortgage Lending Before the Housing
Bubble
Before private investors entered the secondary mortgage
market, lenders obtained funding to lend money by borrowing
against depositor accounts or by issuing bonds. 43 Utilizing
depositor accounts or bonds as funding mechanisms limited
lenders’ capacity to offer residential mortgages because the
“demand for [loans] increased more rapidly” than that of lenderissued bonds or depository accounts. 44
After loans were closed and funded, borrowers began making
monthly payments and lenders retained the loans in their
portfolios. Loan retention meant that the risk associated with
extending financing to borrowers was absorbed by lenders’
portfolios. For example, on fixed-rate mortgages, lenders’ portfolios
absorbed any loss that occurred if market interest rates adjusted
upward. 45 The absorption of loss is exactly what happened in the
39. See Examining the Securitization of Mortgages and Other Assets:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv., 111th Cong. (Oct. 7,
2009) [hereinafter “Securitization Hearing”] (statement of Patricia A. McCoy,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111shrg397/html/CHRG-111shrg397.htm (stating that loan origination models
during the housing bubble encouraged lenders to “pass the trash”).
40. See Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 441 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2010) (stating that because securitizations became increasingly
complex and widespread, they contributed to the “crisis in the financial
markets”).
41. Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2016).
42. Dodd-Frank § 5512.
43. Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Banks, Asset
Securitization: Comptroller’s Handbook 2 (Nov. 1997), www.occ.gov/publi
cations/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/asse tsec.pdf.
44. Mortgages Proposal Hearing, supra note 3, at 228 (statement of Lewis
Ranieri).
45. See id. at 232 (statement of Lewis Ranieri) (explaining that inviting
private investors to participate in the secondary mortgage market would
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early 1980s when interest rates significantly increased above that
of the interest rates on the portfolios of fixed-rate mortgages. 46 As
a result of the increase in interest rates, the Federal National
Mortgage Association47 lost millions of dollars in 1981 and 1982.
On the other hand, the practice of retaining mortgage loans in
lenders’ portfolios incentivized lenders to underwrite loans based
on what risk the lenders were willing to absorb. 48 Financing was
extended based upon several factors regarding borrowers’ ability
to repay the banks. 49 Lenders required borrowers to provide
documentation to support their income and debts. 50 Some lenders
would only lend exclusively to borrowers who had a previous
depository relationship with the financial institution, 51 which
made lenders with relationship banking programs more

alleviate some of the interest rate risk to thrifts associated with the
“traditional attitude of ‘originate and hold’.”)
46. Id. at 207 (statement of David O. Maxwell, Chairman and Chief Exec.
Officer, Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n).
47. Federal National Mortgage Association [hereinafter “Fannie Mae” is a
government-sponsored enterprise created in response to the crisis of the Great
Depression. Federal Housing Finance Agency, Office of the Inspector General,
History of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises, http://fhfaoig.gov/
LearnMore/History (last visited Apr. 25, 2016). Generally, Fannie Mae is
responsible for “creating liquidity in the mortgage market.” Id.
48. See Securitization Hearing, supra note 39 (statement of Patricia A.
McCoy) (stating that once private investors entered the secondary mortgage
market “[l]enders cared less about underwriting because they knew investors
would bear the brunt if the loans went belly up.’).
49. See e.g., Know What Lenders Look For: Improve Your Chances of
Getting a Loan by Learning what Lenders Look for [hereinafter “Know What
Lenders Look For”], WELLS FARGO, www.wellsfargo.com/financial-education/
credit-management/five-c/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) (reciting the “5 C’s” of
credit that lenders use to assess the credit risk of an individual borrower); see
also Dickerson, supra note 2, at 397-99 (Apr. 2009) (explaining that mortgage
lending “[u]ntil the late 1970s” most often required documentation of
borrowers’ “income and assets”).
50. See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble
and the Resulting Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. of Bus. Inquiry 120, 124
(2009) www.uvu.edu/woodbury/docs/summaryoftheprimarycauseofthehousing
bubble.pdf (“[B]orrowers . . . had to prove that their income was sufficient to
ensure that the monthly mortgage payments would be manageable.”); see also
Chris Isidore, Liar Loans: Mortgage Woes Beyond Subprime, CNN (Mar. 19,
2007),
http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/19/news/economy/next_subprime/index.
htm (predicting that reduced documentation loans that became prevalent in
2004 and 2005 would contribute to a housing bubble bust).
51. Relationship lending is the practice of using a borrower’s financial
habits across different financial products with the same bank to assess
whether that bank should extend financing. See generally Sreedhar Bharath
et al., So what do I get? The Bank’s View of Lending Relationships, 85 J. FIN.
ECON. 368-419 (2007) www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/sd/publication7506.pdf (discussing the impacts of relationship banking on lenders and
borrowers).
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comfortable with extending financing to those borrowers who had
established relationships with the bank. 52

B. Expansion: Residential Mortgage Lending During
the Housing Bubble
After 2003, private investor activity in the secondary
mortgage market more than tripled from 12% to 38% of residential
mortgage originations. 53 By 2005, private investor activity in the
secondary mortgage market accounted for approximately half “of
all new securitizations.”54 With this increase in capital from
private investors, the secondary mortgage market provided an
effective means to fund home purchases. 55 Rather than relying on
borrowing against depositor accounts and issuing bonds, lending
institutions relied upon the proceeds earned from the sale of pools
of mortgage loans to fund mortgage lending. 56 Purchasers of pools
of mortgage loans included a wide variety and amount of investors,
which eased the restriction on available capital for residential
mortgage loan originations. 57 In a securitization the pooled
mortgage loans are sold to investors, 58 thereby transferring the

52. See Elyas Elyasiani & Lawrence G. Goldberg, Relationship Lending: A
Survey of the Literature 56 J. ECON. & BUS . 315-330, 315-316 (Mar. 2004)
(stating that the amount of information that a lender gathers throughout the
financial relationship with the borrower is “valuable” to the lender’s decision
on whether to extend financing).
53. Viral Acharya et al., Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
the Debacle of Mortgage Finance 33, http://research.stlouisfed.org/conferences
/gse/White.pdf.
54. Ronel Elul, Securitization and Mortgage Default 3 (Research Dep’t,
Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No . 09-21/R, 2011),
www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/workingpapers/2009/wp09-21R.pdf.
55. Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass’n, Investor’s Guide: Mortgage-Backed
Securities (MBS) and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) 1 (2010)
[hereinafter “Investor’s Guide”], www.fidelity.com/static/dcle/learning-center
/documents/MBS-CMOs.pdf.
56. See David Luttrell, Harvey Rosenblum, & Jackson Thies,
Understanding the Risks Inherent in Shadow Banking: A Primer and Practical
Lessons Learned 24 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, No. 18 Nov. 2012) (stating
that the “demand for [mortgage-backed] securities . . . generates more
mortgage lending to supply mortgage pools”).
57. See id. at 9 (explaining the process of shadow banking).
58. In a securitization:
[t]o obtain funds to make more loans, mortgage lenders pool
groups of loans with similar characteristics to create
securities or sell the loans to issuers of mortgage securities.
As the borrowers whose loans are in the pool make their
mortgage payments, the money is collected and distributed
on a pro rata basis to the holders of the securities.
Quick Guide, supra note 3, at 4.
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risk associated with those loans from the lender’s portfolio onto
the investor’s portfolio. 59
Once lenders were able to use securitization as a means to
escape the risks of residential lending, 60 lenders’ goals changed
from extending financing to a creditworthy borrower to extending
financing that would be a suitable investment risk for a third
party investor. 61 Underwriting standards loosened while lenders
aggressively closed more loans. 62 For example, instead of relying
upon documents that would evidence a borrower’s income and
debt, a lender would rely upon the figures the borrower stated on
the loan application. 63
In addition to relaxing underwriting methods, lenders began
to offer non-traditional mortgage products to borrowers who were
traditionally deemed unqualified for these products. 64 The next
three sub-sections briefly outline the features of three nontraditional mortgage products: negative amortization loans,
interest-only loans, and balloon loans.
1.

Negative Amortization

A negative amortization loan offers extremely low minimum
payments at the beginning of the loan’s term. 65 The loan payments
consist of only payments that cover a fraction of the accruing
interest on the loan. 66 Sophisticated borrowers tend to take

59. See id. at 1 (explaining that this is a simplified description of what
occurs when mortgage loans are securitized. While the investor takes on the
risk through her investment, the risk, on paper, lies with a trust created for
the special purpose of securitization.).
60. See Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and
the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 63 Duke L.J. 637, 649 (Dec. 2013)
(highlighting the shift of risk from the financial institution that created the
trust to the trust’s investors).
61. See McLean & Nocera, supra note 17, at 134 (stating that investors’
funneling of money into securitizations was “dictating what kind of mortgages
they would buy and at what price”).
62. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
ROOT
CAUSES
OF
THE
FORECLOSURE
CRISIS
vii
(Jan.
2010),
www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/Foreclosure_09.pdf.
63. Cyprus Credit Union v. Dehlin, No. 09-20955, 2011 WL 1261623,
(March 31, 2011), at *2 (Bankr. Utah) (explaining that the residential
mortgage loan the debtors received was based upon a statement of the debtors’
income rather than documented verification of the income).
64. See Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that nontraditional products were traditionally reserved for “wealthier” or more
“sophisticated” borrowers).
65. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Interest-Only Mortgage Payments and
Payment Option-ARMs: Are they for you?, FDIC (Oct. 31, 2006),
www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/interest-only/ (stating that the payments
on a negative amortization loan “may not cover all of the interest owed”).
66. Id.
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advantage of these low payments to participate in other
investment activities. 67 However, during the period of low monthly
payments, the interest that the borrower is not paying accrues on
top of the principal balance, 68 which yields a principal balance that
is more than what was originally borrowed. 69 When the period of
low monthly payments is over, the payments significantly increase
to cover the outstanding principal balance and the interest that
has accrued on the principal balance. 70 The new payments are
amortized over the period of time specified in the mortgage loan
documents. 71
For example, in Wells Fargo Bank v. Kristall,72 the note that
was associated with the mortgage upon which Wells Fargo was
foreclosing had a negative amortization provision. 73 Although the
principal sum of the note was $568,000, the principal sum had the
potential to increase to $710,000 because of negative
amortization. 74 As explained in the previous paragraph, the
negative amortization in Kristall’s case stood to increase the
principal by 125% of the original amount borrowed. 75
2.

Balloon Loans

A balloon loan requires monthly payments that may be
reasonably affordable at the beginning of the loan term. 76
However, by the end of the loan term the loan calls for one large
“lump-sum” payment to pay the loan in full. 77 Like negative
amortization loans, balloon loans offer an incentive to
67. See Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 27, at 1.
68. See Great Lakes Higher Education Corporation & Affiliates, Top Six
Ways to Reduce What You Owe, GREAT LAKES, www.mygreatlakes.
org/educate/knowledge-center/reduce-what-you-owe.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2016) (explaining capitalization in terms of interest on student loans where
the student borrower ends up paying interest on interest).
69. Id.
70. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 35 (explaining how negative
amortization works for an $180,000 mortgage loan).
71. Id.
72. Wells Fargo Bank v. Kristall, No. 27927-11 2014 LEXIS 4063 (N.Y.
App. Div. Sept. 8, 2014).
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also Second Amended Complaint at 12-13, California v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. LC081846, 2008 WL 4615941 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. filed June 25, 2008) (explaining how the principal balance on a
particular negative amortization loan could increase from $460,000 to
$523,792 and the monthly payments could increase from $1,480 to $3,748).
76. See generally Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What is a
Balloon Loan? When Is one Allowed?, (Dec. 30, 2013), www.consumerfinance
.gov/askcfpb/104/what-is-a-balloon-loan.html (explaining the payment features
of a balloon loan).
77. Id.
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sophisticated borrowers who want to free up capital for other
investment activities. 78
For example, in the bankruptcy of Terra Hooper Smith, 79
Smith’s $51,200 balloon loan required equal payments of $542.07
for a term of 12 years at 12.39% interest, and one large payment at
the end of the term to pay the loan in full. 80 The initial payments
of $542.07 were not enough to pay the loan in full. 81 This resulted
in the bank’s claim that the borrowers owed $50,583 at the end of
the term. 82 Unlike the negative amortization loan in Kristall, the
principal balance of Smith’s loan never increased above the
original amount borrowed.
3.

Interest-Only Loans

An interest-only loan allows the borrower to make payments
consisting of only the interest due on the loan. 83 The interest-only
payments continue for an amount of time specified in the
mortgage loan documents, usually five or ten years. 84 After the
interest-only period, the monthly payments increase to reflect the
amount due to repay the principal and interest in full by the end of
the loan term. 85

C. Contraction: Residential Mortgage Lending After the
Housing Bubble
Once the housing bubble burst, private investors retreated
from the secondary mortgage market. 86 This retreat left the
78. See Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that low payments
are attractive to sophisticated borrowers so that the borrowers may “capitalize
on other investment opportunities”).
79. In re Smith, No. 12-07447-8-SWH, 2013 LEXIS 3443 (Bankr. E.D. N.C.
2013).
80. Id. at *1.
81. In order to pay the loan in full at the end of the term, Smith’s monthly
payments should have been $684.61 per month. See Mortgage Calculator,
BANKRATE .COM
www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/mortgage calculator.aspx (input the loan characteristics into the calculator in order to
obtain the resulting monthly payment).
82. Smith, 2013 LEXIS 3443, at *1.
83. Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 27, at 3.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. John Griffith, The Federal Housing Administration Saved the Housing
Market,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS
(Oct.
11,
2012),
www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/report/2012/10/11/40824/the-federal
-housing-administration-saved-the-housing-market/ (“As private investors
retreated from the mortgage business in the wake of the worst housing crisis
since the Great Depression, the Federal Housing Administration increased its
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alternate
investors
–
government-sponsored
enterprises
(hereinafter “GSEs”) – as the primary participants in the
secondary mortgage market. 87 “In the first half of 2010, the GSEs
accounted for a whopping 64% of all single-family mortgage
securities.”88
Congress responded to the depressed housing market with the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”). 89 Dodd-Frank’s purpose
was to provide “financial regulatory reform” and to protect
“investors and consumers” from the aggressive lending practices
that occurred during the bubble. 90
Additionally, Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (hereinafter “CFPB”) for the purpose of
“enforc[ing] Federal consumer financial law consistently [to
ensure] that all consumers have access to markets for consumer
financial products and services and that markets for consumer
financial products and services are fair, transparent, and
competitive.”91 One of the CFPB’s functions is to “issu[e] rules,
orders, and guidance implementing Federal consumer financial
law.”92 When issuing rules under federal consumer financial laws,
the CFPB must consider the impact of the rule on consumers and
“the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer
Financial products.”93 Pursuant to its rulemaking authority, the
CFPB implemented the Ability-to-Repay rule (hereinafter
“ATR”). 94

D. Congressional Response: Defining a Qualified
Mortgage Under the ATR
The scope of the ATR is limited to closed-end consumer credit
transactions that are secured by a dwelling (hereinafter “covered
transactions”). 95 Covered transactions are divided into two groups:
qualified mortgages and non-qualified mortgages. 96 The main
distinction between qualified mortgages and non-qualified
mortgages is that qualified mortgages are afforded the protection
of either a safe harbor or rebuttable presumption of compliance.
insurance activity to keep money flowing into the mark et.”).
87. Acharya, supra note 53, at 56.
88. Id.
89. Dodd-Frank 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2016).
90. H.R. Rep No. 111-517, at 1 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
91. Dodd-Frank § 5511(a).
92. Dodd-Frank § 5511(c)(5).
93. Dodd-Frank § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i)
94. ATR 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43 (2016).
95. ATR § 1026.43(a).
96. See ATR § 1026.43 (e) (carving out special rules for qualified
mortgages).
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Non-qualified mortgages are ineligible for these protections. 97 The
main similarity is that both types of loans require the lender to
extend financing to the borrower on the basis of the borrower’s
reasonable ability to repay the loan. 98
1.

Qualified Mortgages 99

Generally, the ATR defines a qualified mortgage as one that
is a traditional mortgage product that has a term that “does not
exceed 30 years.”100 Qualified mortgages cannot have excessive
“points and fees [that are] payable in connection with the loan.” 101
The ATR goes further to designate a conservative underwriting
methodology for the borrower’s “mortgage-related obligations,” and
other “current debt obligations.”102 Finally, the ATR proscribes a
maximum debt-to-income ratio of 43% for qualified mortgages, 103
which must be substantiated by documenting and verifying the
borrower’s income and obligations. 104
Qualified mortgages are afforded the protection of a safe
harbor, or a rebuttable presumption of compliance in the case of a
higher priced transaction. 105 The presumption of compliance can
be rebutted by a showing that the lender “did not make a
reasonable and good faith determination of the [borrower’s]
repayment ability at the time of consummation” and that the
lender knew that extending financing to the borrower “would leave
the [borrower] with insufficient residual income or assets.” 106
2.

Non-qualified Mortgages 107

Under the ATR, non-traditional mortgage products are nonqualified mortgages.108 The general requirements for non-qualified
mortgages mandate that non-qualified mortgages be consummated
based on the same standards as qualified mortgages that are
afforded a rebuttable presumption of compliance. 109 Both the non97. ATR § 1026.43(e)(1).
98. ATR § 1026.43(c)(2), (e)(1)(ii).
99. Throughout this comment, the term “qualified mortgages” is used
interchangeably with the term “traditional mortgage products.”
100. See ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(i)-(ii) (excluding mortgage loans that have
features of non-traditional mortgage products).
101. ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(iii).
102. ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv).
103. ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi).
104. ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(v).
105. ATR § 1026.43(e)(1).
106. ATR § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii)(B).
107. Throughout this comment, the term “non-qualified mortgages” is used
interchangeably with “non-traditional mortgage products.”
108. ATR § 1026.43(e) (2013).
109. ATR § 1026.43(c)(1), (e)(1)(ii)(B).
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qualified mortgage and the qualified mortgage that is afforded a
rebuttable presumption of compliance must be consummated
based on a “reasonable and good faith determination [that the
borrower] will have a reasonable ability to repay the loan
according to its terms.”110 As set forth in the Parts III and IV of
this comment, this glaring similarity is the ultimate reason why
non-qualified mortgages should receive the protection of a
rebuttable presumption of compliance.

III. A NALYSIS: R ESTRICTING BORROWER A CCESS TO NONTRADITIONAL MORTGAGE PRODUCTS WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION
Excluding non-traditional mortgage products from the
protection of a rebuttable presumption of compliance will deter
lenders from offering non-traditional mortgage products. 111
Without the legal protection of a rebuttable presumption of
compliance, mortgage originations will primarily consist of
traditional mortgage products, 112 which will restrict the
availability of non-traditional mortgage products. 113
The fixed rate, interest only loan [which is a non-traditional
mortgage product because of its interest-only feature], for example, .
. . is a useful product for many consumers. The product offers low
monthly payments, tax advantages, and a reset with a long window
before refinance . . . providing a great deal of flexibility to
consumers.114

Furthermore, the absence of non-traditional mortgage
products in the primary market will remove the variety that

110. ATR § 1026.43(c)(1), (e)(1)(ii)(B).
111. Ronald L. Rubin, The Essentials: the CFPB’s Final Ability -toRepay/Qualified Mortgage Rules, CHI . BAR ASS ’N (Jan. 22, 2013),
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bbb84425-c0c1-44ec-b5a6-7dbaac99
54c3 (concluding that the ATR rule will lead to “reduced credit availability”
and the unavailability of some types of loans).
112. ATR Rule and QM Standards, supra note 31, at 6515 (“[I]ndustry
commenters argued that the qualified mortgage criteria should not exclude
specific loan products because the result will be that such products will be
unavailable in the market.”).
113. Ronald L. Rubin, The Essentials: the CFPB’s Final Ability -toRepay/Qualified Mortgage Rules, HUNTON & WILLIAMS (Jan. 2013),
http://documents.lexology.com/b8e35bef-49f1-4894-97ef-b005817b2d6a.pdf
(concluding that the ATR rule will lead to “reduced credit availability” and the
unavailability of some types of loans).
114. Letter from Kenneth L. Miller, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Bank of
America, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 10 (July 22, 2011), www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB2011-0008-0902.
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investors sought in MBS. 115 MBS will consist of only traditional
mortgage products, rather than containing a diverse pool of
mortgages from which investors can choose to purchase. This will
adversely impact the growth of the secondary mortgage market, 116
which will, in turn, decrease the amount of much needed private
capital117 to fund home purchases. 118
The following analysis examines the ATR’s exclusion of nontraditional mortgage products from the protection of a rebuttable
presumption of compliance, and the justifications given for the
exclusion. The analysis reveals that the justifications for exclusion
do not address the risks that non-traditional mortgage products
pose to unsophisticated borrowers. 119 Also, the ATR does not
substantially
distinguish
underwriting
practices
between
traditional and non-traditional mortgages such that excluding
non-traditional mortgage products is justified.

115. See Goldman Sachs Asset Management, A Reference Guide to
Mortgages, Bank Loans, and Structured Credit: The Nuts and Bolts of Fixed
Income Management 8 (2008), www.wallstreetoasis.com/files/Reference_Guid
e_to_Mortgages.pdf (stating that diversity in “instruments and products” is
what makes MBS “unique” investments).
116. See Robert H. Ledig, Ralph R. Mazzeo & Thomas P. Vartanian,
Impact of Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rules on Residential
Mortgage Loan Purchasers, RMBS Participants, and Mortgage Industry
Investors, DECHERT LLP, (Oct. 2013), http://sites.edechert.com/10/1815/
october-2013/impact-of-ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgage-rules-onresidential-mortgage-loan-purchasers--rmbs-participants-and-mortgageindustry-investors.asp?intEmailHistoryId=4094877&intExternalSystemId=1
(stating that creditors “will be reluctant to make non-QM loans” because of
“inherent risks”). That reluctance will most likely be based upon the lack of a
safe harbor or presumption of compliance as offered for QM loans. Id.
117. See Investors Guide, supra note 54 at 2 (stating that “[m]ortgage
securities play a crucial role in the availability and cost of housing in the
United States.”); ATR Rule and QM Standards, supra note 31, at 6411 (stating
that “private investors have withdrawn from the mortgage securitization
market and there are no other effective secondary measures in place[.]”); id. at
6412 (stating that “[o]utside of the securitization available through the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) for loans primarily
backed by FHA, there are very few alternatives in place today to assume the
secondary market functions served by the [government-sponsored
enterprises].”).
118. The reduced amount of participants in the secondary mortgage
market may be enough on its own to deter investors from investing. See
Investor’s Guide, supra note 55, at 22 (listing one “important consideration”
when investing in MBSs as “the level of activity in the secondary market
should [the investor] need to sell the security”).
119. See Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that
“unsophisticated financial consumers . . . are less likely” to appreciate the
value in a non-traditional mortgage product).
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A. Justifications for Excluding Non-Traditional
Mortgage Products from the Rebuttable Presumption
of Compliance
The recent decline of the housing market is most often
attributed to “loose underwriting practices” and the “failure [of
lenders] to verify” borrowers’ repayment ability. 120 However, in
implementing the ATR the CFPB was addressing the concern that
non-traditional mortgage products should not be qualified
mortgages simply because of their inherent risk. 121 Also, the CFPB
aimed to provide “objective criteria which creditors can
conclusively demonstrate were met at the time of origination.” 122
Without much inquiry into the effect the exclusion would have on
the secondary mortgage market and consumer access to nontraditional mortgage products, the CFPB excluded non-traditional
mortgage products from the protection of a rebuttable presumption
of compliance. 123 The CFPB appears to have based the decision to
exclude on “idiosyncratic” priorities without fully inquiring into
the effects of the decision. 124 Such an inquiry would have revealed
that the purported benefits of the exclusion do not justify leaving
non-traditional mortgage products without the protection of a
rebuttable presumption of compliance. 125

120. Loose underwriting practices by some creditors – including failure to
verify the consumer’s income or debts and qualifying consumers for mortgages
based on ‘teaser’ interest rates that would cause monthly payments to jump to
unaffordable levels after the first few years – contributed to a mortgage crisis
that led to the nation’s most serious recession since the Great Depression.
ATR Rule and QM Standards, supra note 31, at 6408.
121. See Todd Zywicki, Striking the Right Balance: Investor and Consumer
Protection in the New Financial Marketplace, 81 G EO. WASH. L. REV . 856, 876
(Apr. 2013) (explaining that the CFPB’s decision to exclude non -traditional
mortgage products is one effect of the Agency having a “narrowly defined,
single focus on consumer protection.”).
122. ATR Rule and QM Standards, supra note 31, at 6515; see also, Letter
from Ken Markison, Assoc. Vice President and Regulatory Counsel, Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau,
(Sept. 14, 2012) www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-00220172 (stating that “[t]he product, documentation and underwriting
requirements must be based on objective, bright line standards”)
(emphasis in original).
123. See ATR 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(A)-(C)(2016) (requiring monthly
payments on QMs to be “substantially equal” and not result in negative
amortization, deferred principal payments, or balloon payments).
124. Zywicki, supra note 121, at 876.
125. See Letter from Miller, supra note 114 (stating that “[p]roduct type is
not representative of the ability to repay, and the Qualified Mortgage rule
should not exclude specific loan products.”).
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The Inherent Risk Justification

The argument that non-traditional mortgage products should
not be subject to a rebuttable presumption of compliance because
of their inherent risk overlooks the true cause of borrower defaults
on these types of loans. 126 The cause of default is the initial
underwriting of the loan which extends financing to a borrower
who has not evidenced their repayment ability when the monthly
payments are set to increase. 127 For example, in the case of
negative amortization loans, lenders are in the position during
loan underwriting to conservatively estimate changes in the
monthly payment once full payments of principal and interest
become due. 128 Another example is in the case of balloon loans
where lenders are in the position during underwriting to assess
the borrower’s ability to repay once the lump sum is due. 129 These
conservative approaches should be the approaches lenders take
during underwriting to determine whether the borrower can
sustain the changes in monthly payments on non-traditional
mortgage products. 130

126. See, e.g., Letter from Anne C. Canfield, Executive Dir., Consumer
Mortg. Coalition to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 8 (July 22, 2011) www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;
D=CFPB-2011-0008-1406 (suggesting that one cause was the lender’s
underwriting methodology rather than the loan product type).
127. See ATR Rule and QM Standards, supra note 31, at 6510 (stating that
“[t]he statutory underwriting requirements for a [QM] – for example, the
requirement that loans be underwritten on a fully amortized basis . . . and not
a teaser rate . . . will help prevent a return to . . . lax lending.”); Letter from
Americans for Financial Reform to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of
Governors
of
the
Fed.
Reserve
Sys.,
8
(July
22,
2011),
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2011-0008-1519 (stating that
“the only sensible approach to protect consumers against payment shock” on a
non-traditional mortgage loan is to conservatively underwrite the loan to
account for changes in the payment throughout the life of the loan as specified
by the note); and compare to Letter from Ctr. for Responsible Lending, et. al.
to the CFPB and the Fed. Reserve Bd., 6 (July 22, 2011),
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2011-0008-1294 (stating that
“[i]t is worth remembering that the subprime market was once dominated by
fixed rate traditional loans [that had] no built-in payment shock. They were
simply high cost loans, made to equity-rich, vulnerable customers who could
not afford them.”).
128. See Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 27, at 29 (stating that lenders
must consider “potential negative amortization” when making the
determination of whether to extend financing on a non -traditional mortgage
product).
129. See, e.g., Fannie Mae Single Family Feb. 23, 2016 Selling Guide, Part
B3-6-04,
www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/selling/b2/1.3/02.html#ARM.20
Payment.20Shock (specifying certain circumstances in which the lender must
qualify the borrower based on a “qualifying rate” rather than the rate specified
in the note).
130. See Peter J. Wallison, The True Origins of this Financial Crisis, The
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Furthermore, the change in the borrower’s monthly payment
on a non-traditional mortgage product can hardly be seen as a
shock. 131 The terms of the change are outlined in the mortgage
loan documents that the borrower signs at consummation. 132 It is
no surprise that after the period of low monthly payments expires,
the increased payments of principal and interest will become due
as specified in the mortgage loan documents.
The ATR takes a conservative approach in requiring specific
payment calculations for non-traditional mortgage products. 133
Under the ATR, non-traditional mortgage products will be
extended only to borrowers who have a documented ability to
repay the loans. 134 Limiting the extension of non-traditional
mortgage products in the manner the ATR specifies ensures that
only borrowers who can afford all of the monthly payments will be
eligible for these products. Therefore, the fear of payment shock on
a non-traditional mortgage product is an unconvincing reason to
exclude an entire class of mortgage products from the protection of
a rebuttable presumption of compliance. 135
Non-traditional mortgage products should be extended to
borrowers who have evidenced a reasonable ability to repay the
loan. 136 The lender should determine repayment ability based on a
American Spectator, (Feb. 2009) (attributing the “bubble in housing prices” to
loose underwriting standards, the increased “availability of credit for
mortgages,” and “the speculation in housing”); see also STAN J. LIEBOWITZ,
ANATOMY OF A TRAIN WRECK: CAUSES OF THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN (Oct. 3,
2008),
www.independent.org/pdf/policy_reports/2008-10-03-trainwreck.pdf
(pointing to the “intentional weakening of the traditional mortgage -lending
standards” as being the epicenter of the bubble).
131. See generally Fishbein & Woodall, supra note 27, at 1 (referring to the
sudden increase in mortgage payments on non-traditional mortgage products
as “payment shock”).
132.
See,
e.g.,
Fannie
Mae,
Fixed/Adjustable
Rate
Note,
www.fanniemae.com/content/legal_form/3522.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
133. See VAL SRINIVAS & RYAN ZAGONE , FIRST LOOK: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ABILITY- TO-REPAY RULE AND THE Q UALIFIED MORTGAGE DEFINITION, 7
(2013),
www2.deloitte.com/za/en/pages/financial-services/articles/ability-torepay.html (discussing the importance of applying “conservative underwriting,
similar to what is anticipated for non-[qualified mortgages]” to loans that are
not subject to the ATR rule).
134. See ATR 12 CFR § 1026.43(c)(4)(2016) (requiring “verification of
income or assets”).
135. See Letter from Miller, supra note 114, at 10 (arguing against
excluding non-traditional products from the definition of a qualified
mortgage).
136. ATR § 1026.43(c)(4). Furthermore, borrowers most likely to be able to
afford non-traditional mortgage products will be sophisticated borrowers. See
Dickerson, supra note 12, at 413 (stating that it appears unsophisticated
“borrowers . . . accepted exotic loans without understanding that [there were]
less expensive lending options . . . available”); but see Zywicki, supra note 121,
at 904 (stating that non-traditional “mortgage products were used
disproportionately by sophisticated, high-income borrowers with prime scores
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reasonable and good faith determination. 137 Requiring such a
determination to be made for non-traditional mortgage products
adequately addresses the inherent risk in non-traditional
mortgage products. It also justifies affording the products the
protection of a rebuttable presumption of compliance.
2.

The Objective Criteria Justification

Another argument for excluding non-traditional mortgage
products from the protection of a rebuttable presumption of
compliance reasons that the exclusion will allow the CFPB to
provide objective criteria for traditional mortgage products. 138
However, this view negates the purpose of the objective criteria
and does not address the view that non-traditional mortgage
products are inherently more of a risk than traditional mortgage
loans.
However, the ATR currently provides objective criteria that
reveal whether the lender made a reasonable and good faith
determination of the borrower’s repayment ability. These objective
criteria consist of limiting the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio to
43%, 139 and requiring documentation and verification of income or
assets. 140 The ATR rule mandates the utilization of the debt-toincome ratio criterion for traditional mortgage loans, 141 but not for
non-traditional mortgage loans. 142 The income or asset
documentation criterion applies to both traditional and nontraditional mortgage loans. 143 As addressed in the proposal to this
comment, the 43% debt-to-income ratio should apply to nontraditional mortgage products as well.
a.

How the 43% Maximum DTI Serves as an Objective
Criterion

The purpose of analyzing a borrower’s debt-to-income ratio is
to provide the lender with a general view of the borrower’s
capacity to afford the mortgage. 144 The debt-to-income ratio is not

who were ‘more strategic [defaulters]’”).
137. ATR § 1026.43(c)(1).
138. See Letter from Markison, supra note 122 (stating that a definition of
qualified mortgages that includes “bright line standards . . . is the only sure
means to serve the widest array of qualified borrowers”).
139. ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi).
140. ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(v).
141. ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi).
142. ATR § 1026.43 (e)(2)(vi).
143. ATR § 1026.43(c)(4),(e)(2)(v).
144. Even during the housing bubble lenders were cognizant of the
importance of the debt-to-income ratio. See ATR Rule and QM Standards,
supra note 31, at 6412 (citing statistics from CoreLogic’s TrueStandings
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enough on its own to determine whether the borrower has a
reasonable ability to repay. 145 The debt-to-income ratio is used in
conjunction with other characteristics in the borrower’s credit
profile that gives lenders a basis to deny or approve the extension
of financing to the borrower. 146 Even with the picture that a DTI
can paint about a borrower’s credit profile, the DTI is only as
reliable as the underlying methods used to calculate it. 147
However, the DTI serves as a mathematical indicator of the
borrower’s ability to afford the mortgage payments at the
borrower’s verified income level.
The ATR restricts the debt-to-income ratio to 43% for
traditional mortgage products. 148 However, the ATR provides no
restriction on a lender’s internal debt-to-income ratio for nontraditional mortgage products. 149 The lack of direction on how high
the debt-to-income ratio should be for non-traditional mortgage
products will force lenders to set their own internal debt-to-income
ratios for non-traditional mortgage products. 150 This is one reason
why the objective criteria of the 43% maximum DTI should apply
to both traditional and non-traditional mortgage products.
b.

How Income and Asset Documentation Requirements
Serve as Objective Criteria

The absence or presence of a document is an objective method
by which it is easily determined whether a particular requirement
was met. 151 The ATR requires income or asset documentation for
Servicing Database that show the weighted average DTI was 39.8% “in the
peak of the housing bubble”).
145. See generally Know What Lenders Look For, supra note 49 (finding
that a variety of factors determines whether the borrower can qualify for a
loan).
146. Id.
147. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 16, Assured Guar. Mun.
Corp. v. Flagstar Bank FSB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102722 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 8,
2011) (“As part of [an auditor’s] ongoing investigation of . . . files for the loans
[pooled in the securitizations], [the auditor] discovered numerous loans where
misstatements related to income dramatically affected the borrower’s DTI . . .
For example, [the auditor found] a $150,000 loan . . . made under a stated
income documentation program. The borrower claimed a monthly income of
$9,350 [but the auditor’s investigation revealed] that the borrower’s monthly
income was actually $2,000 at the time the loan was originated. The DTI ratio
. . . was [actually] 189% [an in excess of] the 45 percent maximum DTI
permitted under the applicable underwriting guidelines.”)
148. ATR 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43 (2016).
149. Id.
150. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks,
71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 at 58,613-58,614 (Oct. 4, 2006) (stating that the
responsibility of setting “prudent and appropriate underwriting standards” is
that of the lending institution).
151. See generally Letter from Markison, supra note 122 (stating that a
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both traditional and non-traditional mortgage products. 152 In
prohibiting lenders from extending financing to borrowers without
documenting and verifying income or assets, 153 the ATR
establishes an objective standard: either the loan was properly
documented with paystubs or tax returns, or it was not. Therefore,
if the documentation is missing, the loan is not ATR compliant.
Considering the ATR requires income or asset documentation for
non-traditional mortgage products, these products should be
afforded the protection of a rebuttable presumption of compliance.

B. No Substantial Distinction in Underwriting
Practices Between Traditional and Non-Traditional
Mortgage Products
In addressing the concerns of relaxed underwriting practices
that occurred during the expansion of the housing bubble, the ATR
restricts certain underwriting practices for traditional and nontraditional mortgage products. 154 Generally, the restrictions guide
the lender to use conservative monthly payment calculations and
income documentation methods when determining whether to
extend financing. 155 The expectation is that traditional mortgage
products would have to be underwritten more conservatively than
non-traditional mortgage products, because traditional mortgage
products are afforded the protection of either the safe harbor or
rebuttable presumption of compliance. 156
However,
rather
than
requiring
more
conservative
underwriting methodologies for traditional mortgage products, the
ATR gives lenders a guide to underwriting traditional mortgage
products that does not restrict underwriting methodologies any
more than what is required for non-traditional mortgage
products. 157 The following examples of income calculations show
the reasonable and unreasonable approaches to underwriting. The
definition of qualified mortgages that includes “bright line standards . . . is the
only sure means to serve the widest array of qualified borrowers”).
152. ATR § 1026.43(c)(4), (e)(2)(v).
153. ATR § 1026.43(c)(4), (e)(2)(v).
154. See e.g., SRINIVAS & ZAGONE , supra note 133, at 2 (stating that the
ATR prohibits a lender from judging repayment ability based on an
“introductory . . . rate without regard for affordability after the interest rate
resets, a practice frequently undertaken during the mortgage boom”).
155. Id.
156. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, SUMMARY OF THE
ABILITY-TO-REPAY AND Q UALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE AND THE CONCURRENT
PROPOSAL 3 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201301_cfpb_ability-torepay-summary.pdf (stating, for example, that “higher-priced mortgage loans”
are protected by a “rebuttable presumption of compliance if creditors follow
[ATR] requirements.”).
157. ATR 12 C.F.R. pt. 26 app. Q (2016).
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comparisons in these examples reveal that the underwriting
standards the ATR mandates for traditional mortgage products
are not substantially distinct from those standards mandated for
non-traditional mortgage products.
1.

An Unreasonable Determination of Income

The case of Assured Guaranty Municipal Corporation v.
Flagstar Bank, FSB provides an example of an unreasonable
method by which to calculate income. 158 There, some of the
underlying loans in a securitization were underwritten to a stated
income standard where the borrowers did not provide proof of the
income stated on the loan application. 159 The underwriter
compared the borrower’s income as stated on the loan application
against income levels listed on publicly available databases. 160 The
underwriter’s determination of whether the stated income was
reasonable depended upon whether the stated income fell in a
particular range as shown in the database. 161
In determining whether an expert’s testimony regarding a
violation of representations and warranties was admissible162, the
court found that evidence of misrepresentation of stated income is
“inherently material” in determining whether there is a breach of
representations and warranties between the parties in an MBS
transaction. 163 The lesson there is that had the income been
documented with paystubs or W-2 forms, the amount of
misrepresentation that occurred in that case would have been
significantly less than what the expert found. 164 For traditional
and non-traditional mortgage products, the ATR requires
verification and documentation of the borrower’s income so that
unreasonable determinations like that in Assured Guaranty do not
occur. 165
2.

A Reasonable Determination of Income

When a statute gave examples of the types of documents
required to evidence income, the court in Massey v. Casals 166 used
evidence of an individual’s lifestyle and representations in other
158. Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. Flagstar Bank FSB, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16682 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2013).
159. Id. at *12-13
160. Id. at *14.
161. Id. at *14.
162. Id. at *1.
163. Id. at *101-102
164. See Id. at *32 (stating that the expert found evidence of fraud in
approximately 34% of the securitized loans).
165. ATR 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(4), (e)(2)(v) (2016).
166. Massey v. Casals, 315 S.W.3d 788 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
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documents to calculate income for an award of child support. 167 In
Massey, a father’s representation of his income to a lender for a
mortgage loan was significantly more than what he represented to
the juvenile court in an action against him for child support
payments. 168 The statute listed examples such as “’tax returns for
prior years [or] check stubs’” as sufficient for deriving an income
calculation. 169
For traditional mortgage products, the ATR mandates that
income documentation such as tax returns and paystubs be
provided in support of the borrower’s income. 170 For nontraditional mortgage products, the ATR does not require the same
form of income documentation that is required for traditional
mortgage products. 171 However, for non-traditional mortgage
products the ATR requires that income be verified by reasonably
reliable records which evidence the borrower’s income. 172 Like the
court determined in Massey, in extending financing for a nontraditional mortgage product, a lender’s reasonable determination
of a borrower’s income may rest upon a combination of tax returns,
paystubs, or other documents that reveal his income. These are
the same documents that the ATR requires the lender to obtain
when extending financing for a traditional mortgage product. 173

IV. PROPOSAL: PROVIDING BORROWERS ACCESS TO NONTRADITIONAL MORTGAGE PRODUCTS
The ATR provides the framework for lenders to restrain
underwriting practices from turning into the loose practices that
occurred during the expansion of the housing bubble. 174 The ATR
should apply that same framework to non-traditional mortgage
products and afford those products the protection of a rebuttable
presumption of compliance. The following proposal outlines the
similarities in the determinations the ATR requires for traditional
mortgage products and non-traditional mortgage products. The
similarities reveal that the determinations are so similar that no
rulemaking is required to heighten the requirements for non167. Id. at 795 (finding that “the evidence of [the] Father’s expenses and
lifestyle” support a finding in favor against the father for a child support
order).
168. Flagstar Bank FSB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16682 at *12.
169. Id. at *15.
170. ATR 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026 app. Q(I)(D)((4)(a) (2016) (requiring “signed,
dated individual tax returns” in order to document income for self -employed
borrowers).
171. ATR § 1026.43.
172. ATR § 1026.43(c)(3).
173. ATR pt. 1026 app. Q.
174. See generally ATR § 1026.43 (providing detailed provisions for lenders
in determining whether borrowers have reasonable repayment abilities).
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traditional mortgage products so that they may be afforded a
rebuttable presumption of compliance. 175 Next, the proposal
highlights the major differences, revealing that where the ATR
regulates underwriting practices for traditional mortgage
products, non-traditional mortgage products can be regulated in
the same manner. Finally, the comment proposes that the ATR
should be amended to afford non-traditional mortgage products a
rebuttable presumption of compliance, which would effectively
eliminate the distinction between qualified mortgages and nonqualified mortgages.

A. Applying the Framework
For traditional mortgage products that are afforded a
rebuttable presumption of compliance, 176 the ATR specifies
detailed standards under which traditional mortgage products can
be consummated. 177 The detailed standards for traditional
mortgage products can be applied to non-traditional mortgage
products as well. 178 In fact, the ATR’s requirements between
traditional mortgage products that are afforded a rebuttable
presumption of compliance and non-traditional mortgage products
are already quite similar. 179 The similarities show that not much
administrative rulemaking would need to be done in order to
afford non-traditional mortgage products the protection of a
rebuttable presumption of compliance.

175. See Dodd-Frank 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (2016) (establishing that the
CFPB’s general rulemaking authority is limited to “prescrib[in g] rules . . .
orders . . . and guidance as may be necessary . . . to enable the [CFPB] to
administer and carry out [its] purposes and objectives”) (emphasis added).
176. ATR 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii) (2016) (establishing the rebuttable
presumption of compliance afforded to qualified mortgages that are “higherpriced covered transactions”).
177. ATR § 1026.43(e)(2) (2016) (mandating specific payment calculations,
a maximum debt-to-income ratio of 43%, the types of loan products that are
qualified mortgages, the limit on “points and fees payable in connection with
the loan,” loan documentation standards, bright-line underwriting standards
by way of reference to Appendix Q, and a maximum loan term of 30 years loan
term of 30 years).
178. See Letter from Americans for Financial Reform, supra note 127, at 8
(“It seems, therefore, logical and desirable for the ability to repay calculation
on non-QM mortgages using variable rates - which may include these other,
unstable features — to be underwritten to the highest payment possible.”)
179. See ATR § 1026.43(c)(2)-(7),(e)(2)(i)-(vi) (mandating the same
reasonable and good faith determination to be made between the two types of
loan products).

884

The John Marshall Law Review

1.

[49:857

The Similarities

The most obvious similarity is the “reasonable and good faith
determination”180 that the lender must make when deciding
whether to extend financing. The ATR explicitly requires lenders
to make a reasonable and good faith determination for nontraditional mortgage products. 181 The ATR implicitly requires the
same determination for traditional mortgage products that are
afforded a rebuttable presumption of compliance. 182 Therefore, no
rulemaking would be required to change or heighten the standard
of underwriting determinations for non-traditional mortgage
products. 183
The next similarity is extremely important in determining the
type of borrower that should qualify for non-traditional mortgage
products because it deals directly with the borrower’s ability to
make the mortgage payments. 184 For non-traditional mortgage
products, the ATR requires conservative payment calculations to
determine whether the borrower can sustain the monthly
mortgage payments. 185 For example, on a non-traditional mortgage
product with a negative amortization feature, the monthly
payment must be based on “the maximum loan amount over the
term of the loan”, rather than the lower principal balance at
consummation. 186 For traditional mortgage products, the ATR
180. ATR § 1026.43 (c)(1).
181. See ATR § 1026.43 (c)(1) (stating that “A [lender] shall not make a
loan that is a covered transaction unless the creditor makes a reasonable and
good faith determination at or before consummation that the [borrower] will
have a reasonable ability to repay the loan.”).
182. See ATR § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii)(B) (providing that in order to rebut the
presumption of compliance it must be shown, inter alia, that the lender “did
not make a reasonable and good faith determination of the [borrower’s]
repayment ability at the time of consummation”).
183. Dodd-Frank limits the CFPB’s rulemaking authority to only those
rules or orders that are necessary. See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (2016)
(establishing that the CFPB’s general rulemaking authority is limited to
“prescrib[ing] rules . . . orders . . . and guidance as may be necessary . . . to
enable the [CFPB] to administer and carry out [its] purposes and objectives”)
(emphasis added).
184. See Poonkulali Thangavelu, How Much House Can You Buy?,
BANKRATE .COM , www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/new-house-calculat
or.aspx#HMHCYB (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) (suggesting that lenders are
chiefly concerned with the borrower’s repayment ability and implying that the
monthly payment on the mortgage loan for which the borrower is applying is
of significant importance to that determination).
185. See ATR 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(5)(B)(ii)(C) (2016) (outlining the
payment calculations required to be made on negative amortization loans).
186. See ATR § 1026.43 (c)(5)(B)(ii)(C) (outlining the payment calculations
required to be made on negative amortization loans); see also In re Smith, No.
12-07447-8-SWH, 2013 LEXIS 3443 (Bankr. E.D. N.C.) (providing an example
of a balloon-loan that had the ATR been applicable, the lender would have
used the higher monthly payment of $684.61 to assess Smith’s repayment
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requires a conservative payment calculation which is based on
monthly payments that will pay the loan in full over the loan
term. 187 In the area of the borrower’s reasonable ability to repay,
the CFPB would not need to adjust the ATR’s standards for nontraditional mortgage products. 188
Another similarity relates to the practice of lenders during
the expansion of the housing bubble of utilizing unverified or
undocumented income to extend financing to borrowers. The ATR
explicitly requires income or assets used in the determination of
the borrower’s ability to repay any loan (qualified mortgage or
non-qualified mortgage) to be verified and documented. In the area
of documenting income, the rule does not need to be revised to
provide a heightened standard for non-traditional mortgage
products.
2.

The Differences

The first difference is the 43% maximum debt-to-income ratio,
which does not apply to non-traditional mortgage products.
Considering non-traditional mortgage products have “higher risk
elements”, 189 steps should be taken to ensure that non-traditional
mortgage products are extended only to those borrowers who can
truly afford the payments. 190 In fact, regardless of whether nontraditional mortgage products are afforded the protection of a
rebuttable presumption of compliance, the maximum 43% debt-toincome ratio should apply to the determination required for nontraditional mortgage products.

ability).
187. See ATR § 1026.43(e)(2)(i) (requiring the loan to feature monthly
payments that are substantially equal); see also § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv) (mandating
that the traditional mortgage loan product be underwritten based on mo nthly
payments that will pay the loan in full by the end of the loan term).
188. See Arnold & Porter, LLP, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule (Feb. 2013),
www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/ADV213TheCFPBsAbilityToRepa
yAndQualifiedMortgageRule.pdf
(noting
that
the
required payment
calculations for both qualified mortgages and non-qualified mortgages are
similar).
189. FDIC, supra note 35; see also Jason Thomas, Fannie, Freddie, and the
Crisis, 17 NATIONAL AFFAIRS 36, (Fall 2013), www.nationalaffairs.com/
doclib/20130920_Thomas.pdf (stating that non-traditional mortgage loans
“defaulted in large numbers beginning in 2007”).
190. Letter from Barry Zigas, Dir. of Hous. Policy, Consumer Fed’n of
America, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 9 (July 22, 2011) www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-20110008-0859 (stating that the way to protect consumers from payment shock on
a non-traditional step-rate mortgage is to underwrite the loan “using the
highest rate that can occur during the life of the loan”).
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The second difference is in the amount of guidance the ATR
provides for traditional mortgage products. 191 The guidance does
not substantially distinguish required underwriting practices
between traditional and non-traditional mortgage products.
However, it does provide bright-line standards for lenders to apply
to their underwriting procedures. 192 Like the 43% maximum debtto-income requirement, these bright-line standards should be
added to the determinations required for non-traditional mortgage
products regardless of whether they are afforded a rebuttable
presumption of compliance.

B. Affording Non-Traditional Mortgage Products a
Rebuttable Presumption of Compliance
With standards in place to ensure that a non-traditional
mortgage product is extended to a borrower for whom the lender
has determined possesses reasonable repayment ability, the only
thing left to do is to presume that the non-traditional mortgage
product complies with the ATR rule. 193 In the event of litigation
regarding the loan, the borrower would be faced with having to
show that the lender did not make a reasonable and good faith
determination of the borrower’s repayment ability. 194
Non-traditional mortgage products fall under the umbrella of
non-qualified mortgages, 195 while traditional mortgage loans fall
under the umbrella of qualified mortgages. 196 The major
distinction between qualified mortgages and non-qualified
mortgages is the protection of a safe harbor or rebuttable
presumption of compliance that the ATR rule provides to qualified
mortgages. If the requirements of traditional mortgage products
are imposed upon non-traditional mortgage products, then there is

191. See ATR 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026 app. Q (2016) (detailing the type of
standards that “resolve the appropriate treatment of a specific kind of debt or
income where the standards provide a discernible answer to the question of
how to treat the debt or income.”).
192. ATR pt. 1026 app. Q.
193. See Christopher Palmer, Why did so Many Subprime Borrowers
Default During the Crisis: Loose Credit or Plummeting Prices?, 8 (Nov. 15,
2013),
http://web.mit.edu/cjpalmer/www/CPalmer_JMP.pdf
(stating
that
“Underwriting Standards and market conditions . . . interact to generate
defaults.”).
194. See Ledig, Mazzeo & Vartanian, supra note 116, (stating that
rebuttable presumption defenses are not available for non-QM loans).
195. See ATR 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(i)(A)-(C) (2016) (excluding negative
amortization, interest-only, and certain balloon-payment loans from the
definition of a qualified mortgage).
196. See ATR § 1026.43 (e)(2)(i)(A)-(C) (excluding negative amortization,
interest-only, and certain balloon-payment loans from the definition of a
qualified mortgage).
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no reason for the distinction the ATR makes between qualified
mortgages and non-qualified mortgages.

V. FUELING THE CONTROLLED R EBIRTH OF THE
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
With proper regulation in place, 197 the MBS market can invite
participation from private investors without replicating the
unbridled growth the market experienced during the most recent
housing bubble. 198 At the first signs of a runaway mortgage
market, the CFPB and other federal financial administrative
agencies can exercise their rulemaking authority to restrain
financial institutions from making unsound lending decisions. 199
However, deterring lenders from offering non-traditional mortgage
products will stunt the growth of the secondary mortgage
market. 200

197. See Dickerson, supra note 12, at 398 (explaining how deregulation
affected the consumer credit markets since the mid-1970s).
198. See Letter from Kurt Pfotenhauer, Senior Vice President, Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 6 (Mar. 29,
2006),
www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2006/June/20060627/OP-1246/OP1246_28_1.pdf
(stating
“In
developing
qualification
standards
for
nontraditional mortgage products, lenders should account for possible risks
associated with the non- and/or negative amortizing features of a mortgage
product.”).
199. See Dodd-Frank 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(5) (2016) (establishing one of the
objectives of the CFPB to be that of ensuring “markets for consumer financial
products and services operate transparently and efficiently to facilitate access
and innovation”).
200. This deterrence will be similar to what happened in the student loan
market, for example. See Dickerson, supra note 12, at 416 (explaining the
retreat of student loan lenders from the marketplace when investors no longer
wanted to participate in the secondary market for student loans).
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